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Why not order direct-to-consumer genetic testing for your children? 
ELINE M. BUNNIK1 
 
Predictive genetic testing in childhood is generally considered morally justified only if 
there are clear medical benefits to be obtained from testing that cannot be obtained 
otherwise.2 In clinical genetics, physicians and genetic counsellors have traditionally 
acted as gatekeepers against unwarranted genetic testing of children, protecting them 
against harm and respecting their right not to know genetic information. Today, 
individuals may access direct-to-consumer online genetic profiling services that lack 
such systems of control. Companies sometimes encourage their customers to order 
genetic testing not only for themselves, but also for their children.3 By purchasing 
genetic testing for their children, parents are depriving those children of future 
opportunities for autonomous medical decision-making. In a recent policy-oriented 
report on medical profiling and online medicine, the authoritative UK-based Nuffield 
Council on Bioethics slightly overlooks and misrepresents the central ethical issues in 
childhood testing in four ways.  
 
First, in its section on direct-to-consumer genetic profiling, the Nuffield report 
recommends that children ought not to be tested for conditions that do not meet the 
National Screening Committee (NSC) list of criteria.4 This list, an adaptation of the 
original Wilson and Jungner criteria from the late 1960s,5 has been composed for the 
purposes of the (ethical) evaluation of national screening programmes. Many of these 
criteria, such as “the condition must be an important public health problem”, are 
intended to be applied to population-based (or large-scale) public health programmes. 
In the rather different healthcare situation in which individual consumers are to 
undergo genetic testing on their own or their parents’ initiative, the suitability of these 
criteria is unclear. For example, NSC criteria such as “the programme should be 
acceptable to health professionals and the public”6 and “the programme should 
represent value for money”7 are not directly relevant to the evaluation of consumer-
driven individual genetic profiling. The Nuffield report applies a set of existing 
criteria to novel practices, but it does not argue whether and how such translation is 
justified.  
 
Second, the Nuffield report formulates another recommendation with regard to the 
testing of children, namely that valid parental consent is required. When sending their 
child’s DNA sample to a laboratory, customers should “click on a statement 
confirming that they […] have parental responsibility in the case of children.”8 It is 
questionable whether the ‘clicking on a statement’ may constitute valid parental 
consent. One might argue that the validity of consent depends largely on its being 
informed. While the concept of informed consent has been widely discussed, its 
ethical significance has rarely been challenged. In present-day clinical genetics, 
informed consent is a central part of the counselling trajectory and understood to be a 
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careful, face-to-face communicative process to ensure informed, autonomous 
decision-making on the part of the counsellee.9 It is a matter of debate whether such 
very stringent consent requirements should also apply to the commercial context of 
direct-to-consumer genetic profiling, but in any case something like informed consent 
will be ethically required. This process should not be reduced to the clicking on a 
statement.    
 
Third, the absence or presence of parental consent is irrelevant to a more important 
ethical issue: may parents rightfully purchase genetic profiling at all for their 
children? Precisely this question should be the focus of an ethical evaluation of online 
genetic profiling services for children or minors. One of the fundamental principles of 
medical ethics is respect for the autonomy of persons and the consequent right not to 
know certain information. For this reason, children are commonly not tested for late-
onset diseases in clinical genetics.10 Only a positive balance of benefits and harms 
may justify predictive genetic testing in children, such as when early interventions 
may bring medical benefit to the child. Most online genetic profiling services, on the 
other hand, convey personal risk information of limited clinical validity for late-onset 
complex diseases. As yet, such information has not proven to yield any medical 
benefit.11 In the absence of medical benefit, convincing reasons to override the child’s 
right not to know are lacking.12 Therefore, genetic profiling should currently not be 
offered in childhood, and it follows that parents should refrain from purchasing online 
genetic profiling for their children. The Nuffield Council may or may not support 
these conclusions, but in any case it is clear that its recommendation to have parents 
‘click on a statement’ is unlikely to help raise awareness of the real ethical issues 
surrounding genetic testing in children and minors. 
 
Finally, the Nuffield report argues on the basis of the principle of harm reduction and 
thus considers ethical issues surrounding childhood testing primarily in terms of harm. 
It acknowledges that it may be harmful or stigmatising to children to know their 
genetic risk, “given that” the children and parents involved “cannot un-know” the 
information and that the child “did not decide himself or herself to take the DNA 
profiling test.”13 The child’s right not to know is thus subsumed under the heading of 
harm. But not only should children be protected against harm – and so against harmful 
information; they should also be protected against undue infringements upon their 
right not to know. The latter is a separate and important ethical issue that ought to be 
presented such.  
 
In conclusion, predictive genetic testing of children is warranted almost exclusively in 
cases of (early-onset) diseases for which there are therapeutic or preventive options 
that must commence in childhood in order to be effective. In other cases, genetic 
testing ought not to be conducted until individuals may decide for themselves whether 
or not to undergo testing and are able to provide informed consent. The Nuffield 
report fails to address the problem of autonomy and the basic right not to know 
genetic information about oneself. Policy recommendations need to take the guiding 
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ethical principle into account that, where possible, genetic testing ought to be deferred 
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